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The World’s Newest Profession: Management Consulting
in the Twentieth Century. 
Christopher D. McKenna. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006. 370 pp. $30.00.
Management consultants are a significant social and econom-
ic force. Few people, whether as citizens or members of
organizations, will have escaped the impact of their interven-
tions. A survey revealed that 97 percent of the top 200 com-
panies in the U.K. and U.S. have used management consul-
tants. The spectacular growth of the industry in the last fifty
years is evidenced by the fact that somewhere in the region
of 80 percent of firms currently operating were established
after 1980. The ratio of consultants to managers, as this book
demonstrates, has grown from one to a hundred in 1965 to
one to thirteen in 1995. In this clearly written and insightful
book, McKenna seeks to answer the question of how “the
leading consulting firms come to achieve such a dominant
economic and cultural position” (p. 7) by the end of the twen-
tieth century.
In chapter 1, he begins his exploration of the origins of con-
sulting by questioning existing explanations that have
focused on macroeconomic factors. Consultants exist, he
argues, due to a Coasian “economics of knowledge” where-
by consultants “provide their clients with a cost-effective
means to acquire managerial skills, techniques, and process-
es at a lower cost than the equivalent internal studies of the
same problem” (p. 13). The economics of knowledge
explains the underlying demand for outside knowledge but
not the predominance of a particular group of agents through
which it is transmitted. His argument is that this is deter-
mined by key institutional changes in the 1930s and more
recently in the 2000s. In the 1930s, the Glass-Steagall Act
(1933) not only separated commercial and investment bank-
ing but also prohibited a range of occupational groups, includ-
ing bankers, lawyers, accountants, and engineers, from
engaging in consultation activities. This regulatory upheaval
created a jurisdictional vacuum that independent consultants
filled.
Chapter 2 questions the orthodox view that consultants
emerged from Taylorist firms. McKenna argues that Taylorism
suffered a precipitous decline in the 1920s arising from the
inherent inflexibility of its “one-best-way” model and general
antipathy toward it. He points out that modern management
consultancy emerged from the cost accountants who had
grown in number in response to the management audits
mandated by the newly formed Securities and Exchange
Commission. As a result of the separation between auditing
and consulting, the smaller and more focused cost accoun-
tants, such as James O. McKinsey & Co., pursued manage-
ment consulting. In contrast, auditors such as Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. and Arthur Andersen and Co. decided to
remain accountants. McKenna therefore argues that it is the
forced withdrawal of the large accountants and bankers as a
result of regulatory changes that enabled a small number of
firms to dominate the market for consulting advice.
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The next three chapters recount detailed stories of the use of
consultants by a range of client organizations, including
Lukens Steel, the American federal government and a range
of nonprofit organizations. Each of these chapters involves
micro case studies of consultants transferring knowledge to
clients. The broad argument is captured when McKenna
argues that “At a cost of less than 2 percent of Lukens’
annual net income, management consultants represented a
cost-effective means to guard against the serious structural,
strategic and technological changes that might have other-
wise blind-sided the firm and its executives” (p. 79).
In chapter 6, McKenna argues that by the 1960s, manage-
ment consulting had institutionalized, with Booz Allen &
Hamilton, Cresap, McCormick and Paget, and McKinsey and
Co. becoming the “big three.” Indeed, 1960 marked these
firms’ apogee, and their character at this time has come to
define the public’s enduring perception of consulting. These
three consultancies were larger than the largest law firms but
smaller than the bigger accountancy firms. Their revenues
ranged from $2.1 million to $12 million. They each had
offices in Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and Los Ange-
les. Their consultants were well paid, with some partners
earning more than the chief executive officers of some of the
largest companies. Their cultures were homogenous: primari-
ly men recruited from a small number of Ivy League universi-
ties with a conservative dress code. McKenna’s point here is
that these firms were characterized by strong internal cul-
tures that acted as a key strategic asset. So when McKinsey
internationalized in the 1960s and 1970s, it “chose to Ameri-
canize its international staff, not internationalize its own,
American culture” (p. 164). As he argues in chapter 7, this
was initially tremendously attractive, because European firms
were keen to acquire American “know-how.” As a conse-
quence, “American management consulting firms served as
the primary institutional conduits for the transfer of American
organizational models to Europe” (p. 166). For McKinsey, the
focal case study for the chapter, this meant decentralization
and multidivisional models. By restructuring many European
organizations in the mid-1960s, its London office had grown
to become its second largest office, and half its revenues
came from outside the United States. So influential was the
firm that ‘“to McKinsey’ came to mean the complete restruc-
turing of the firm” (p. 181).
By the 1970s, however, the market for such consultancy had
dried-up because most large European firms had been decen-
tralized. The combination of the diminishing power of the
American model and a recession following the oil crisis
resulted in a sharp decline in demand for consultancy. This
book argues that McKinsey responded by turning inward and
offering itself as a consultancy product. It codified and com-
moditized its culture into a “corporate culture” package. In
this respect, McKinsey’s aim was to “remake their corporate
clients in the image of other successful organizations” (p.
195). In this case, it was McKinsey itself. As chapter 8
explains, although McKinsey had lost ground to Arthur Ander-
sen and Co. and the Boston Consulting Group, by the 1980s
it had regained its competitive edge with the introduction of
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corporate culture supported by its own copyrighted models.
But as McKenna points out, a greater reliance on more
ephemeral (i.e., fashionable) ideas creates greater levels of
uncertainty for clients and consultants. If a firm does not ride
the successive waves of fashionable ideas, its livelihood is
threatened.
Chapter 9 explores the implications for the consulting indus-
try of, first, a liability crisis in the 1980s and then Enron. As a
result of a number of legal judgments determining that direc-
tors were personally liable for the decisions they took, the
“management audit” of the 1930s was resurrected, with the
consequence that consultants moved from selling knowledge
to selling legitimacy. In essence, McKenna argues that exec-
utives were protected from negligence claims and could
demonstrate “informed business judgement” if they could
prove that they had followed the advice of a recently com-
missioned consultancy report. This situation not only “resus-
citated the dormant logic” (p. 228) of the 1930s “manage-
ment audit” but fueled an expansion in demand for
consulting work that drew in the large accounting firms,
which were keen to develop consultancy divisions to subsi-
dize their loss-incurring audit businesses. By 1992, revenues
from consulting in the Big Six accounting firms were larger
than fees from auditing, and by 1998, the then Big Five
employed more than 62,000 consultants and billed more than
$12 billion annually. But the combination of auditing and con-
sulting, particularly within a single client, created suspicions
of potential conflicts of interest. This came to a head when it
was revealed after the collapse of Enron, the then seventh-
largest American corporation, that its auditor—Arthur Ander-
sen—had billed Enron more in consulting than audit fees. The
resultant outcry led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which
recreated the legislative framework of the 1930s by banning
accounting firms from offering management consulting ser-
vices to audit clients. Once again, regulatory intervention
restructured the consulting industry as the large accounting
firms divested themselves of consulting and other services.
The book ends with a discussion of the professionalization
project within the industry. McKenna concludes that even if
management consultants had “not yet attained full profes-
sional status within society, they had achieved both internal
stability in their firms and durable institutional demand for
their services” (p. 249). Thus the setbacks on the path
toward full professional status have done little to slow the
overall development of management consultancy.
For this reader, the book suffers from three main deficien-
cies. It is difficult to sustain the claim that it represents a
comprehensive and broadly based understanding of the
emergence of the consulting industry when so many of the
chapters are focused on the actions of a very small number
of initially U.S.-based firms. One consequence of this is that
alternative patterns of development in other countries are
glossed over. Indeed, McKenna undermines his critique of
the influence of Taylorist consultancies on the emergence of
the industry in chapter 2 when he writes that these firms
“continued to dominate the market for organizational advice
in Europe through the 1950s” (p. 169). Why was this the
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case? Second, the book has very little to say about the emer-
gence of the consultancy firms once attached to the large
accountancy or information technology firms. Why do these
firms now dominate the consultancy market? The book also
lacks theoretical punch. The argument that the industry has
oscillated between offering clients legitimacy and knowledge
could have been more strongly integrated into the general
narrative. The chapter on the “economies of knowledge”
completely overlooks the consulting literature that has drawn
explicitly on the ideas of Coase and transaction cost econom-
ics. Despite these limitations, however, this is a fascinating
book whose accessible and clear writing style should ensure
a wide readership. The footnotes provide a wonderful
resource for any student of management consulting and
knowledge-intensive firms. Its broad sweep and rich detail
mean that it is destined to become a key text in this area.
Timothy Clark
Durham Business School
Durham University
Durham, DH1 3LB
United Kingdom
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